An Analytic Model for DoD Investment & Divestment Decisions

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


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Problem: DoD finds it difficult to prepare for and responsively enact Divestments



Outline: How do we fix it?

Leverage the successes of

others

Develop a model

Recommend Changes

Model for divestment decisions



- Reward shared awareness
- Track decisions
- Institute divestment panels


Summary:

Poor Analytics→Omitted Criteria→Cognitive Bias*→ROT→BP**→Y/N

Omitted Criterion	Cognitive Bias	DoD Rules of Thumb for Divestment	Recommended Best Practices	Model Y/N Criterion
Organizational and Operational Impacts	Reasoning by Analogy	Take from those who have a lotCut "fairly" (salami)	Dedicate a (small) full- time team to Divestment planning	Mission Critical?
Performance Viability	Illusion of ControlEscalating Commitment	 Use trigger events to re-baseline Penalize the transparent 	Plan the details of a divestment transition for the timeframe needed	Core Competency? High performance? Modernization Impact?
Economic Value	Single outcome calculation	 Pay for new w/ unrelated funds Congressional favor 	 Account for the de- integration costs Track key variables to calculate a comparable SROI 	Cost effective? Secondary effects? Deadweight?


^{*}Irene M. Duhaime and Charles R. Schwenk, "Conjectures on Cognitive Simplification in Acquisition and Divestment Decision Making," Academy of Management Review, 1985, Vol, 10, No. 2, 287-295;

^{**}Michael C. Mankins, David Harding, and Rolf-Magnus Weddigen, "How the Best Divest," Harvard Business Review, October 2008.



Applying Proven Divestment Approaches to DoD

Simplify the logic, require yes/no answers, and track the data



CBO, "Approaches for Scaling Back the Defense Department's Budget Plans," Mar 2013, p. 13. Found at: http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43997_Defense_Budget.pdf

Selecting Investment Sets for Divestment

Yes = Opt to Keep No = Opt to Divest


Criteria Area	Factor	Discriminator	Acceptance	In/Divest?		
High Strategic Value or Readiness	e or Logic Critical equipping, training, operations		Mission Critical?	Yes		
			Mission Essential or Support?	No		
High Performance or Modernization	Core competency?	Validated Requirement	a. Included on Unified Command Integrated Priority list?	At least three, or b. and c.		
	High performance?	Performance in array of KPP metrics*	b. Average above threshold?	Only two, and		
	Modernization impact?	Impact on Balance of investment types	c. \$ profile defendable w/ Mod needs	not b. and c.		
		Progresses modernization as needed	140			
Economically Sound or Force	Cost Effective	Cost is supportable, LPO outsourced, or is income	Advantageous NPV?	Answer for each		
Structure Sustainable	Secondary Intended sytemalities		Are SE measureable? Do they add/subtract so NPV is worthwhile?	Yes		
	Deadweight	Deadweight impact over-rides investment impact	Does intervention matter to outcome?	NO		

^{*}Capability Performance; Force Protection; Survivability; Sustainment (Reliability, O&S costs); Net-Readiness; Training; & Energy. ©2015 The MITRE Corporation. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

What are All The Combinations? Intuitive? Reflective of ROT? "Seeing criteria profile"

Criteria Area	Factor	Discriminator	Acceptance	Invest	Invest	Invest	Invest	Invest	Divest	Divest	Divest	Divest
High Strategic Value or Readiness	Investment set meets critical equipping, training, and operations needs for current or future missions of critical COCOM forces or vital to accomplishment	Mission Critical?	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	N	Y	Y	
		of a QDR Goal.	Mission Essential or Support?	N	Υ	Υ	N	N	Y	Y	N	N
	Core competency?	Validated Requirement	a. Included on Unified Command Integrated Priority list?	Y	N	Y	N	Y	either	Y	N	Y
High Performance or		Performance in array of KPP metrics*	b. Average above Threshold?	Υ	N	Υ	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Modernization	Modernization impact?	•	c. \$ profile defendable w/ Mod needs	Y	either	Y	Y	Y	N	N	either	either
		9	d. Investment worth technical risk?	Υ	either	Υ	either	either	either	either	either	Y
_	Cost Effective	Cost is supportable, LPO outsourced, or is income	Advantageous NPV?	Y	Y	Y	Y	either	N	N	N	N
Economically Sound or Force Structure Sustainable	Effects+	unintended	Are SE measureable? Do they add/subtract so NPV is worthwhile?	either	Υ	Y	Y	Y	either	N	either	either
			Does intervention matter to outcome?	Y	Y	Y	Υ	Y	either	either	either	either

INVEST OR DIVEST? Examples Discussion



Summary: How do we fix it?

REFLECT ON
MODELS OF
HUMAN CHOICES

ORGANIZE FOR SIMPLE USE

CHANGE THE CONVERSATION

Model for divestment decisions

Leverage the successes of others

Develop a model

Recommend Changes



Research complex spaces with high stakes:

- Social value constructs
- Human Factors
- Insurance Constructs
- Commercial for profit environments
- Economic models

- Identify current short comings
- Simplify the logic
- Incorporate best practice
- Apply DoD Concepts

- Reward shared awareness for improved analytics
- Track investment vs. divestment decisions and data points
- Institute divestment panels

BACKUP

Investments Decisions Are Not the Same as Divestment Decisions

"The thought of giving up a once-treasured possession can be an emotional exercise for anyone, even if the object of affection has outlived its use. As investors, we can find it difficult to sell a once-favored holding—even more difficult than the decision to purchase it." 1

- Why? Self Interest and emotion: Pride, anxiety, neglect, greed, or power. "Anyone with money can buy stocks, but only smart people can sell them" 2
- But the government is not the stock market...
 - "Public money" (a.k.a., "not yours") may bear less emotion, but the mindset space is filled with other emotional elements: politics, power, patriotism, and even altruism.
- Decisions should be made based on ultimate goals
- 1. Franklin Templeton Investments, "The Discipline of Buy and Sell Decisions," http://mobius.blog.franklintempleton.com, March 28, 2013.
- 2. Mark Brown, "Stocks: The Hard Sell," Moneysense.com, April 26, 2013, at: http://www.moneysense.ca/invest/stocks-the-hard-sell.

Order of Buy # Opposite of Order of Sell

Two reasons, especially in the government

Lots of data but limited knowledge

- Gestalt: The whole can be greater than the sum of the parts
- Interdependencies unlikely to be well understood
- Imperfect information, lack of causality measurement

Causes pause when we divest, as the "whole" must be taken or comes apart

Weak measures of success

- No common value proposition (e.g., profits or stock prices), normalized value scale, or way to compare impacts of decisions to the "bottom line"
- Size of budgets become \$ meter—does not promote divestment
- •The notion of "affordability" is challenging to define/execute

Hard to defend decisions

Rules of Thumb: Biases

Four types of cognitive biases in decision-making, depending on predisposition toward the investment, drive "rules of thumb" 1

Investment Activity	Cognitive Bias
Consideration of	Reasoning by analogy: "In the decision process leading to acquisition,
alternative	decision makers rely on analogies to simpler situations that may bear
acquisition	little similarity to their strategic problem."
	<u>Illusion of control</u> : "In the evaluation of an acquisition, decision makers
	overestimate the potential impact of their expertise on the acquired
	unit's performance."
Management of the	<u>Illusion of control</u> : (see above)
acquisition	Escalating commitment: "Information on declining performance of the
	unit triggers rationalization and escalating commitment."
Consideration of	Single outcome calculation: "When divestment of a failing unit is finally
divestment	considered, it quickly becomes the only course of action considered."

^{1.} Irene M. Duhaime and Charles R. Schwenk, "Conjectures on Cognitive Simplification in Acquisition and Divestment Decision Making," Academy of Management Review, 1985, Vol, 10, No. 2, 287-295.

Rules of Thumb: Private Sector Remedies 1

Private Sector

- Dedicate a team to divestment full-time, just as you do with acquisitions.
- Establish objective criteria for determining divestment candidates don't panic and sell for a song in bad times
- Work through all the details of the deintegration process before you divest
- Make sure you can clearly articulate how the deal will benefit the buyer and how you will motivate the unit's employees to stay until the deal is done.

Observations on DoD

- DoD has thousands of people that work on strategic and investment planning
- Government must still think about fiscal losses

- Government should invest to remedy the knowledge shortfall about their investments
 - Costs of transition and divestment is often captured in DoD, but an underappreciated because it takes a long time

^{1.} Michael C. Mankins, David Harding, and Rolf-Magnus Weddigen, "How the Best Divest," Harvard Business Review, October 2008.

Rules of Thumb: Government Divestment

Rule Applied in Government

Those that "seem to have a lot"

Salami-slice

Programs not sticking to acquisition cost/schedule,

e.g., Nunn-McCurdy breaches or near-breaches

Those with poorly captured performance

Bias to solve gaps using unrelated offsets

Congressional disregard or favoritism

Observation

Goal of bureaucracies is to maximize budgets, yet, proportionally large budgets become a target for redistribution or for "paying bills."

Programs are cut across the board, with a strict percentage regardless of impact ("sequester")

Programs often get "re-baselined." Possibly a divestment, often the same money is spread over time.


Programs that measure may be held to a different standard and are not fiscally rewarded for transparency in effectiveness or efficiency

Refusal to assess baseline for cuts related to gaps, in fear of fiscal penalty biases decisions away from smart cuts

Drives, or saves, many divestment decisions, for all military departments alike.

Logic Model Definitions

- Context: Economic, political, and social circumstances
- Income: Target group needs
- Input: Financial and personnel resources available
- Structure: legal and finance characteristics of sponsor
- Concept: roles, responsibilities, due dates of targets
- Process: targets linked to activities
- Output: directly provided contributions of program/activity to achieve the desired impact(s)
- Outcome(s): effects or desired conditions of target group after activities completed



- Impact: overall effects that are logically, theoretically, or empirically substantiated
- Secondary effects: positive and negative effects not intended by program or activity plans
- Deadweight: portion of outcome(s) that would have been produced w/o program or activities
- Time stamps: (not defined in paper, but offered here)
 - Initial: time taken for initial impacts to be realized
 - Interim: time taken for secondary effects to be observed and quantified or qualified
 - Long-Term: Time taken for relationships between actual impacts and deadweight to be delineated

Insurance Models*

Dennis Lebar, "Insurance Investment Rules are Changing, Ready or Not," InformationWeek.com, 9 Sept 2012; Gill Wadsworth and Monica Woodley, "Investment strategy at an Inflection Point?" BlackRock Global Insurance, 2013.

- Insurance companies pool risk so that the average probability of loss is mediated and competitive premiums can be charged
- Actuarial calculations of premiums for coverage and for gains from insurance capital required ("r") for profitability depend on the accuracy of these pooling statistics
- Insurance models must abide by standards in guidelines to ensure investment diversity/quality for the insured and for investors
- Three large problems exist in insurance modeling:
 - Risk categorization errors: deeper modeling may rate securities lower and subject quality to question, e.g., some bonds are refinanced debt
 - <u>Time</u>: portfolios containing older high-rated securities are stacked with newer, lower rated securities; the average is masked by older and 'timed'
 - Policy: As laws change, previous portfolios get grand-fathered in; this will make portfolio subject to both previous problems, often cause divestment

Government investments are riddled with risk categorization, time, and policy "generation" issues – called Time Inconsistency